Humans have a powerful desire for social status (Anderson et al., 2015) that is motivated by an evolved need for respect, admiration, and influence (Kenrick et al., 2010). In fact, research indicates that status attainment yields substantial benefits. It fuels self-esteem and lowers depression (Fournier, 2009), raises subjective well-being (Anderson, Kraus et al., 2012), improves several health indicators such as stress, weight, affectivity, sleep quality, or coping ability (Adler et al., 2000), and elevates others’ perception of a person’s competence (Anderson and Kilduff, 2009). In light of these benefits, threats to personal status should elicit strong emotional reactions (see Steckler and Tracy, 2014). Consequently, encountering individuals high in status may give rise to an emotion aimed at attaining others’ rank or at decreasing the status of successful competitors – envy (Lange and Crusius, 2015b; van de Ven et al., 2009). Thus, even though envy is often portrayed as morally reprehensible and maladaptive (Smith and Kim, 2007), an inclination to react with envy could actually prove to be functional. Here, we review approaches to dispositional envy and outline how being prone to experience envy may contribute to the regulation of social hierarchies at the interpersonal and societal level.

THE DEFINITION, ONTOGENY, AND DETERMINANTS OF ENVY

Envy is the painful emotion that can occur when people lack another’s superior quality, achievement, or possession, eliciting a desire to also obtain the advantage or a wish that the other loses it (Parrott and Smith, 1993). Therefore, envy is based on an upward social comparison and elicits the motivation to level the difference between the self and the superior standard (van de Ven et al., 2009). Accordingly, envy is enhanced by variables that foster social comparisons (for research
on social comparisons, see Corcoran et al., 2011) such as similarity to the envied person (Henniger and Harris, 2015), domain relevance (Salovey and Rodin, 1984), or the thought that ‘it could have been me’ (van de Ven and Zeelenberg, 2015).

Research suggests that many of the advantages people feel envy about, such as physical attractiveness or financial success (DelPriore et al., 2012), belong to domains in which self-worth is determined by the interest they garner from others (Santor and Walker, 1999). Put differently, some advantages are envied not necessarily because enviers personally consider them to be important, but because these advantages have high societal value – a general principle characterizing various social emotions (Leary et al., 2015). This implies that envy results from a threat to social status. More precisely, we argue that, at its core, envy is borne out of the perceived danger to lose respect and social influence in the eyes of others (Crusius and Lange, 2017; Fiske, 2010; Silver and Sabini, 1978). From this perspective, envy’s function may be to foster the motivation to re-gain status or harm the superior position of others.

Can envy be conceptualized as a personality trait? To establish the usefulness of a dispositional construct, it is necessary to describe a certain class of situations that are frequently encountered and to which individuals vary in how they react. Based on our reasoning, dispositional envy describes individuals’ stable tendency to respond to upward status comparisons with behavior directed at leveling the difference toward these superior others. Therefore, it is crucial to show that (a) humans are in general sensitive to status threats but (b) vary in their inclination to react with negative affect and corresponding behavioral changes to these situations. Evidence corroborates both of these requirements.

Regarding the first point, evidence from diverse areas of the social sciences shows that humans care deeply about social status (Anderson et al., 2015). Notably, young children are already sensitive to hierarchical differentiation as well as unequal distribution of resources. For instance, it has been shown that children use representations of social dominance to predict outcomes of social interactions by the age of 10–13 months (Thomsen et al., 2011) and represent dominance hierarchies by the age of 15 months (Mascaro and Csibra, 2014). Moreover, success-related social emotions (e.g., pride) are recognized across cultures by age four (Tracy and Robins, 2008; Tracy et al., 2005, 2013). These findings imply that responding to success constitutes an innate human characteristic. Finally, other research indicates that three-year-olds respond negatively to unequal distributions, especially when they receive less than their partner (LoBue et al., 2011). Thus, it appears that from early on humans have strong inclinations to attend and react to threats to their own status.

Nevertheless, individuals vary in how much they desire social status (Anderson et al., 2015) and how much they compare their own circumstances to those of others (Gibbons and Buunk, 1999). Therefore, they should also differ in their propensity to experience envy in response to upward status comparisons. Indeed, research supports that the intensity with which children react to status threats varies and changes over time. For example, one study found that children between 7–13 years felt worse after losing a game when their competitor won (i.e., in an envy situation) as opposed to when the competitor also lost (Steinbeis and Singer, 2013). Moreover, their negative affect correlated with a propensity to make unequal decisions in a subsequent resource allocation task, showing the behavioral impact of such situations. These reactions were not constant across participants – the intensity of envious feelings and invidious behavior decreased with age. These findings suggest that even though status threats seem to be a fundamental human motivator, people can develop varying reactions to these threats with increasing age.
Moreover, several other dispositional factors may contribute to individuals’ varying reactions to status threats. Specifically, every variable that influences individuals’ tendency to compare their own status to that of others should affect the development of dispositional envy. To put it differently, traits associated with the dispositional tendency to compare (Gibbons and Buunk, 1999), traits that relate to generalized comparison concerns (for a review, see Garcia et al., 2013), or traits linked to a desire to advance personal standing compared to others (e.g., narcissism; Campbell and Miller, 2011) may shape the envious personality.

One factor linked to comparative inclinations could be inequity aversion (Steinbeis and Singer, 2013). Research supports that inequity aversion develops between three and eight years, with children changing from selfish behavior to equality-based decision making (Fehr et al., 2008). Furthermore, children from the age of three were shown to dislike unfair distributions and display negative reactions to inequality especially when they received less than the other person (LoBue et al., 2011). This pattern of results may indicate envy (see also McAuliffe, Blake, Kim, Wrangham, and Warneken, 2013). Therefore, people who are especially sensitive to inequity aversion may also display increased envious reactions.

Justice sensitivity could be another crucial factor. It relates to comparison concerns (Leach, 2008) and may therefore contribute to developing an envious disposition. Furthermore, higher justice sensitivity is correlated with experiencing more negative emotions and increased rumination (Bondü & Elsner, 2015). Individuals who interpret unfair situations as injustices against themselves (i.e., those with high levels of victim sensitivity) were shown to be aggressive toward their peers when they felt unjustly treated (Bondü and Krahé, 2015). As research indicates that situations that elicit envy are often perceived to be subjectively unfair (Smith et al., 1994), individuals who are particularly sensitive to justice and victimization should be more prone to envy.

As a final example, achievement motivation should also shape individuals’ dispositional envy. Children differ in their motivation to master certain tasks or perform better than their peers in school settings. They can do so either by approaching specific standards or avoiding failure (Elliot and McGregor, 2001). Research suggests that, in essence, these motivational processes are intertwined with social comparisons (Régner et al., 2007). Once a specific motivation is activated, children become more likely to seek comparison information (Butler, 1995). As an increased inclination to compare correlates with dispositional envy (Lange and Crusius, 2015a), achievement motivation should contribute to the development of the envious personality.

In sum, research leads to the prediction that humans are characterized by dispositional envy. First, they have a deeply entrenched sensitivity to status threats. Second, individuals develop varying affective and behavioral reactions to these situations, which are connected to several other personality dimensions. In line with this conclusion, several scholars have independently developed and validated various scales to measure dispositional envy (Belk, 1985; Gold, 1996; Lange and Crusius, 2015a; Rentzsch and Gross, 2015; Smith et al., 1999; Veselka et al., 2014). These scales differ in whether they focus on dispositional envy in general or manifestations of the envious personality in specific contexts. Furthermore, they conceptualize envy as a uniform emotion or having two forms.

**EARLIER CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF DISPOSITIONAL ENVY**

A widely used measure of dispositional envy is the eight-item Dispositional Envy Scale (DES; Smith et al., 1999). It conceptualizes envy as a painful emotion with hostile
interpersonal tendencies. Example items are ‘I feel envy every day’ and ‘Frankly, the success of my neighbors makes me resent them’. The DES has been found to show good internal consistency, \( \alpha = .83–.86 \), and re-test reliability over a two-week period, \( r = .80 \). Correlates of the DES paint a grim picture of the chronically envious. Research employing the DES suggests that enviers are neurotic, disagreeable, insecure (Smith et al., 1999), ungrateful (McCullough et al., 2002), greedy (Seuntjens et al., 2015), and hostile (Rentzsch et al., 2015; Smith et al., 1999). Especially vulnerable narcissists – who hide their insecurity behind a veil of grandiosity – tend to indicate higher values on the DES (Krizan and Johar, 2012). Moreover, the DES correlates with enhanced activity in brain regions that are linked to dysfunctional emotion regulation (Xiang et al., in press). Other studies support that this envious inclination translates into less cooperation (Parks et al., 2002) and more schadenfreude when others fail (James et al., 2014; Krizan and Johar, 2012). Finally, further evidence implies that this pattern of correlates ultimately undermines the envier’s life satisfaction (Smith et al., 1999), well-being (Miltfont and Valdiney, 2009), personal relations, purpose in life, and personal growth (Schindler, 2014).

Two other scales that have been developed to measure dispositional envy in a manner similar to the DES are the York Enviousness Scale (YES; Gold, 1996) and the envy subscale of the Vices and Virtues Scale (VAVS; Veselka et al., 2014). First, the YES consists of 20 items such as ‘The better off someone else is the worse I feel’ and ‘I feel angry when others succeed’ (the items are displayed in Neufeld, 2012). It showed excellent internal consistency, \( \alpha = .89–.91 \), and re-test reliability over a two-month period, \( r = .75 \), but it has been used much less frequently than the DES. The YES has been found to correlate with anger and hostility as well as various indicators of psychopathology such as depression, anxiety, phobia, somatization, and obsession (Gold, 1996). Second, the envy subscale of the VAVS consists of ten items that conceptualize dispositional envy broadly as a facet of subclinical antisocial personality, thereby converging with the DES. Example items include ‘When I am in competition with someone, I feel a sense of bitterness when they come out on top’ and ‘I am annoyed when I see people who buy things that I cannot have’. It has been shown to have good internal consistency, \( \alpha = .73–.87 \), but its re-test reliability has not been assessed so far. The VAVS envy scale has only been recently developed but it has been shown to correlate with inclinations to experience other deadly sins, as well as the Dark Triad of Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy (Veselka et al., 2014).

Other envy scales focus on dispositional envy in specific domains. The most prominent measure is the eight-item envy subscale of Belk’s (1984, 1985) materialism scale. This instrument focuses on envy as an emotion that can be consumption-related. The scale is one of three subscales developed to jointly measure individuals’ inclination toward materialism, a trait associated with the consumption of preferably high-status products (Eastman et al., 1999). Thus, in line with the present framework, Belk regarded envy as a status-related disposition (see also Watson, 2016). Example items are ‘I am bothered when I see people who buy anything they want’ and ‘People who are very wealthy often feel they are too good to talk to average people’. The scale showed acceptable internal consistency, \( \alpha = .64–.80 \), and re-test reliability over a two-week period, \( r = .70 \) (Belk, 1984, 1985). To address methodological weaknesses of the scale when used outside of the United States, it was later refined by modifying and adding some items (Ger and Belk, 1996). The scale also mostly correlated with negative antecedents and consequences. Research using Belk’s scale suggests that enviers are neurotic, disagreeable (Watson, 2015a), ungrateful (McCullough et al., 2002), ashamed, arrogant (Watson, 2015b), and greedy (Krekels and Pandelaere, 2015).
as well as convinced that external forces control their outcomes (Hunt et al., 1990). Other studies indicate that this envious inclination translates into behaviors directed at regaining others’ appreciation, such as impulsive (Shoham et al., 2015) and compulsive buying (O’Guinn and Faber, 1989) of superfluous products. Finally, further evidence implies that these efforts substantially undermine the enviers’ happiness (Belk, 1984, 1985), as well as their satisfaction with their income, standard of living, social situation, and life in general (Ahuvia and Wong, 2002).

Finally, a scale developed recently to measure envy in specific domains is the Domain-Specific Envy Scale (DSES; Rentzsch and Gross, 2015). It consists of 15 items and conceptualizes dispositional envy as the pain felt after upward status comparisons without referring to its consequences. It has three subscales covering the domains of attraction, competence, and wealth, with five items for each domain. These domains reflect the most common domains in which envy was experienced by university students. Although the subscales might be used separately, it can also serve as a composite measure. Example items are ‘It disturbs me when people get along with others better than I do’ and ‘It is hard to bear when other people are more intelligent than I am’. The DSES has been shown to possess excellent internal consistency, \( \alpha = .91–.93 \), and re-test reliability over a three-month period, \( r = .77 \). It has also been shown to correlate with neuroticism, anger, hostility, aggression, perfectionism, and insecurity, as well as lower levels of life satisfaction and poorer mental health in various domains.

In sum, the research that has relied on these scales (i.e., the DES, the YES, the VAVS envy scale, the envy subscale of the materialism scale, and the DSES) converges on a dark profile of the envious personality. It suggests that the envious are emotionally unstable, antisocial individuals who aggress against others and undermine these others’ success, ultimately leading to a substantial drop in their well-being and the quality of their relationships. Thus, so far it seems unlikely that dispositional envy has adaptive elements affecting how individuals respond to others with high status in functional ways. To outline how this is possible, we need to broaden our general understanding of the emotion of envy.

**DISPOSITIONAL BENIGN AND MALICIOUS ENVY**

All of the scales reviewed so far have relied on the same theory of envy. In essence, they conceptualize envy as a uniform, immoral emotion comprised of felt inferiority, resentment for the other, and hostile tendencies (Smith and Kim, 2007). The predictive validity of this view of envy has been supported in various settings and has sparked most of the current research on state and trait envy. However, various other findings are at odds with such a unidimensional portrayal of envy. Indeed, mounting evidence suggests that there are also positive outcomes of envy. For instance, other research shows that dispositional envy is associated with admiration (Schindler, 2014), and that state envy relates to an increased desire to also obtain the other’s advantage (Crusius and Mussweiler, 2012), as well as increases in job performance (Schaubroeck and Lam, 2004).

Recent work proposes that to incorporate these conflicting findings into a theory of envy it is necessary to conceptualize envy not as a unidimensional but as a dual construct. Specifically, recent theorizing about state envy distinguishes between a benign form of envy and a malicious form of envy (Crusius and Lange, 2014; Falcon, 2015; Lange et al., in press; van de ven, 2016; Van de Ven et al., 2009). Next to malicious envy, which is characterized by hostility toward superior others, there is another form of envy that is also marked by painful feelings of inferiority but motivates individuals to improve themselves instead of eliciting begrudging feelings.
Notably, in various languages, two different words relating to envy map onto this distinction. For instance, in German there are the terms *beneiden* and *missgönnten*, in Dutch there are *beneijden* and *afgunst*, in Polish there are *zazdrość* and *zawiść*, and in Thai there are *ìt-chia* and *rít-yaa*. If participants are asked to report emotional experiences corresponding to these specific terms, they recall situations involving benign and malicious forms of envy (Crusius and Lange, 2014). Complementary results were found with languages in which there is only one word for envy such as English or Spanish (Falcon, 2015; Lange et al., in press; van de Ven et al., 2009). If participants in such countries are asked to report envy experiences, they nevertheless describe two qualitatively different kinds of envy. In this research, statistical techniques such as cluster analyses, taxometric analyses, or factor analyses were applied to disentangle benign and malicious envy based on responses to sets of items that should differentiate between the two.

How exactly are these forms of envy different from each other? Research suggests that benign envy is elicited when the envier perceives high control in overcoming the status threat and evaluates the envied person’s success as deserved (Lange et al., 2016; van de Ven et al., 2012). It relates to admiration for the envied person (van de Ven et al., 2009), an attentional shift toward means to reach the envied advantage (Crusius and Lange, 2014), and actual improvement behavior (Lange and Crusius, 2015b; van de Ven et al., 2011). In contrast, malicious envy is elicited when the envier perceives low control in overcoming the status threat and evaluates the success of the envied person as undeserved (Lange et al., 2016; van de Ven et al., 2012). It relates to resentment for the envied person (van de Ven et al., 2009), an attentional shift toward the envied person (Crusius and Lange, 2014), and actual harming behavior (Lange and Crusius, 2015b; van de Ven et al., 2015). These findings suggest that a dual conceptualization of envy is highly useful in capturing the striking diversity in people’s responses toward being outperformed by others.

If state envy is better described by a dual conceptualization than by a uniform one, does the same hold for the dispositional level? To investigate this question, we applied the dual theory of envy to dispositional envy and developed the Benign and Malicious Envy Scale (BeMaS; Lange and Crusius, 2015a), measuring both envy forms with five items for each form. Example items for dispositional benign envy are ‘When I envy others, I focus on how I can become equally successful in the future’ and ‘If I notice that another person is better than me, I try to improve myself’. Example items for dispositional malicious envy are ‘I wish that superior people lose their advantage’ and ‘I feel ill will toward people I envy’. Both scales showed good internal consistencies, $\alpha_{\text{Benign}} = .79-.90$, $\alpha_{\text{Malicious}} = .83-.91$, and retest reliabilities over a three- to four-week period, $r_{\text{Benign}} = .67$, $r_{\text{Malicious}} = .66$. In line with the idea that previous research may have focused predominantly on dispositional malicious envy, the DES correlated with the dispositional malicious envy scale, $r = .65$, but not with the dispositional benign envy scale, $r = .04$ (Lange and Crusius, 2015a). In unpublished data sets we found virtually identical results with the YES, $r_{\text{Malicious}} = .75$, $r_{\text{Benign}} = .01$, the VAVS envy scale, $r_{\text{Malicious}} = .73$, $r_{\text{Benign}} = .17$, and the DSES, $r_{\text{Malicious}} = .66$, $r_{\text{Benign}} = .12$. Nevertheless, dispositional benign envy and malicious envy were both related to the chronic inclination to compare (as measured with the scale from Gibbons and Buunk, 1999) and to the pain experienced when being confronted with an upward status standard. Moreover, dispositional benign envy was correlated with hope for success, whereas dispositional malicious envy was correlated with fear of failure (Lange and Crusius, 2015a). Collectively, these results support that dispositional benign envy constitutes an emotional trait preparing individuals to optimistically approach the standard of high status set by the envied person, whereas...
dispositional malicious envy constitutes an emotional trait preparing individuals to avoid falling short of this standard.

The distinction between dispositional benign and malicious envy can be integrated even more directly into research on status. Although research supports that envy is mainly driven by status comparisons (Crusius and Lange, 2017; Fiske, 2010; Lange and Crusius, 2015b; Silver and Sabini, 1978), previous conceptualizations of dispositional envy did not integrate it with a status approach. We propose that it is useful to take the different pathways to status attainment – prestige and dominance – into account (Cheng et al., 2013; Henrich and Gil-White, 2001; Maner and Case, 2016). In prestige-based hierarchies, status is based on merit and fairness. In such environments, individuals gain respect by sharing skills and know-how, motivating subordinates to emulate their success. If these efforts are successful it is evolutionarily adaptive to develop a chronic prestige strategy. Research suggests that individuals with a tendency to pursue such a strategy are agreeable, emotionally stable people who signal their expertise to others, give advice (Cheng et al., 2010), and overconfidently present their skills (Anderson, Brion et al., 2012). In dominance-based hierarchies, status is based on the outcome of zero-sum conflicts. In such environments, individuals advance by intimidating others, fostering subordinates’ deference. If these efforts are successful it is evolutionarily adaptive to develop a chronic dominance strategy. Research suggests that individuals with such a strategy are disagreeable, neurotic people who aggressively signal their domination to others (Cheng et al., 2010) and assertively spread their opinion, leading others to perceive them as competent (Anderson and Kilduff, 2009). Despite these different strategies, evidence supports that prestigious and dominant individuals gain social influence to a similar degree, although the former are liked substantially more than the latter (Cheng et al., 2013).

Prestige-based and dominance-based hierarchies create vastly different environments. Therefore, individuals who apply either strategy should also respond in highly different ways to status threats. In prestige-based hierarchies, subordinates are likely to perceive high levels of control over their ability to attain status, because status attainment is possible for everyone who is willing to learn (Henrich and Gil-White, 2001). Furthermore, because high status depends on invested effort, it should be evaluated as deserved. This is in line with research supporting that individuals consider others’ successes as just if they were working hard for them (Feather, 1999). Collectively, appraisals of high levels of personal control and deservingness concerning the success of others may elicit the benign form of envy (Lange et al., 2016; van de Ven et al., 2012). Moreover, as benign envy predicts the motivation to improve performance partly via emulating others (Lange et al., in press), dispositional benign envy should foster prestige attainment. Thus, we theorize that benign envy is an emotional response following a threat to a person’s prestige that fosters the motivation to re-gain status.

In contrast, subordinates in dominance-based hierarchies should perceive low control over their ability to attain status because status attainment is contingent on stable physical characteristics (Henrich and Gil-White, 2001). Furthermore, because dominant individuals are disliked, their status should be evaluated as undeserved. This is in line with research supporting that individuals consider their enemies’ successes as unjust (Feather, 1999). Collectively, appraisals of low personal control and low deservingness of the other’s success may elicit malicious envy (Lange et al., 2016; van de Ven et al., 2012). Moreover, as malicious envy predicts the motivation to aggressively get back at others, dispositional malicious envy should foster dominance attainment or help to undermine others’ dominance. Thus, we theorize that malicious envy is an emotional response following a threat to a person’s dominance that
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fosters the motivation to re-gain status or downgrade the other person.

Two separate lines of research provide support for this framework. First, superiors’ displays of prestige and dominance elicited benign and malicious envy in subordinates, respectively (Lange and Crusius, 2015b). More precisely, if high-status individuals displayed prestige via authentic pride (success attributed to effort), the perception of prestige and likability jointly fostered benign envy in subordinates. In contrast, if high-status individuals displayed dominance via hubristic pride (success attributed to talent), the perception of dominance and decreased likability jointly fostered malicious envy in subordinates. Second, individuals who tended to pursue a prestige or a dominance strategy had an increased inclination to experience benign or malicious envy, respectively. We provided indirect evidence for this prediction by linking a personality characteristic to envy which is driven by enhanced desire for status – narcissism (Wallace and Baumeister, 2002). Specifically, individuals characterized by narcissistic admiration are theorized to focus on gaining others’ approval and therefore promote their own qualities (Back et al., 2013). This dynamic represents a prestige strategy. In line with this idea, narcissistic admiration predicted dispositional benign envy (Lange et al., 2016). In contrast, individuals characterized by narcissistic rivalry are theorized to fear losing the approval of others and therefore devalue and aggressively go against them (Back et al., 2013). This dynamic fits a dominance strategy. In line with this idea, narcissistic rivalry predicted dispositional malicious envy (Lange et al., 2016). More direct evidence for this framework indeed suggests that individuals with an enhanced inclination for a prestige or dominance strategy also indicate increased dispositional benign and malicious envy, respectively (Redford et al., 2016).

In sum, dispositional benign envy may be an emotional trait that prepares individuals to re-gain prestige after a threat to their status, whereas dispositional malicious envy may be an emotional trait that prepares individuals to re-gain dominance after a threat to their status. This framework dovetails with the earlier findings. Specifically, the disagreeable, neurotic, and aggressive pattern that emerged in previous research on dispositional envy maps onto the dominance construct. As these earlier scales focused on dispositional malicious envy, this is in line with our predicted relation of dispositional malicious envy and dominance striving. In fact, supporting our argument, Watson (2016) showed that one of the earlier scales – the envy subscale of Belk’s materialism scale – correlates with dominance but not prestige. Moreover, the framework also extends previous conceptualizations of dispositional envy. First, it broadens our understanding of dispositional malicious envy and allows us to derive more precise predictions about its functional value in the regulation of status hierarchies. Second, the framework extends earlier research on dispositional envy by introducing dispositional benign envy – a hitherto entirely neglected form of dispositional envy.

In summary, the present analysis suggests that the envious personality may be described more completely by differentiating between the benign and malicious forms of envy and relating them to prestige and dominance striving. This status framework predicts that dispositional envy is associated with functional consequences as status attainment leads to social influence and societal advancement (Anderson et al., 2015). Do the forms of envy relate to such functional consequences? To put it differently, is dispositional envy indeed functional for the regulation of status hierarchies?

Consequences of Dispositional Benign and Malicious Envy

Placing dispositional benign and malicious envy in the prestige and dominance framework leads to numerous testable predictions.
First, status evolves from social consensus (Anderson et al., 2015) and both prestige and dominance lead to social influence (Cheng et al., 2013). This implies that dispositional benign and malicious envy should manifest in observable behaviors that change others’ perception of the envier as being successful or being feared, respectively. Second, as we theorize that benign and malicious envy trigger a prestige or dominance motivation, respectively, they should activate diverging behavioral strategies. Dispositional benign envy should be associated with striving to gain prestige. In contrast, dispositional malicious envy should be associated with striving to gain dominance or harm others’ status. Finally, changes in individuals’ status affect their well-being (Anderson et al., 2015). Therefore, dispositional benign and malicious envy should also correlate with affective dispositions and life satisfaction.

Does dispositional benign and malicious envy predict behavioral tendencies reflecting prestige and dominance strategies that are being picked up by others? We investigated this in a project on the relation of narcissism and envy (Lange et al., 2016). In many ways, narcissists are enigmatic human beings (Back et al., 2013; Küfner et al., 2013; Leckelt et al., 2015). On the one hand, they are often admired and celebrated. On the other hand, others detest their inflated egos. These seemingly opposing effects can be explained by two distinct, yet positively correlated facets of grandiose narcissism — narcissistic admiration and narcissistic rivalry (Back et al., 2013). As narcissists are driven by their enhanced desire for status (Wallace and Baumeister, 2002), any emotional tendency associated with this struggle may contribute to their paradoxical social consequences. Specifically, if dispositional benign and malicious envy manifest in prestigious or dominant behaviors, they could mediate narcissists’ social effects. Thus, we predicted that the effects of narcissistic admiration and rivalry on social perception may be mediated via dispositional benign and malicious envy (Lange et al., 2016). To investigate this possibility, we asked dyad members to rate their own narcissism and dispositional envy and afterwards rate themselves and their fellow participant on dimensions related to prestigious (personal ambition, others’ compliments and admiration, being well-received) and dominant social outcomes (likelihood of gossiping and schadenfreude). As predicted, the relation of narcissistic admiration with dispositional benign envy mediated an effect on self- and peer-rated prestige. In contrast, the relation of narcissistic rivalry with dispositional malicious envy mediated an effect on self- and peer-rated dominance. Thus, these findings suggest that dispositional benign and malicious envy manifest in observable behavior relevant to status attainment.

Another line of research supports the notion that benign and malicious envy trigger different strategies to regulate status. Specifically, if benign envy is linked to a prestige-based strategy of status attainment, dispositional benign envy should foster prestige-seeking behavior. We investigated this hypothesis with marathon runners (Lange and Crusius, 2015a). We reasoned that outstanding comparison standards encountered during training should elicit emulative tendencies that ultimately translate into higher race performance. Indeed, dispositional benign envy was associated with increased goal setting for the race, mediating an effect on race speed. As finishing a marathon in general or even in a high tempo constitutes a prestigious success, these efforts may be indicative of the desire for prestige. Interestingly, we found that dispositional malicious envy correlated with the avoidance of a concrete race goal. This could imply that they were afraid of losing their current status, which fits a dominance strategy.

We also investigated whether dispositional malicious envy fosters aggressive strategies to gain status or to undermine the status of others. Even though dispositional malicious envy is linked to various dysfunctional outcomes at the intrapersonal level, it could...
be functional at the interpersonal level. For instance, dispositional malicious envy (as measured with the DES or the dispositional malicious envy scale from the BeMaS) correlates with an increased tendency to express schadenfreude when someone suffered a misfortune as rated by the self and by peers (James et al., 2014; Krizan and Johar, 2012; Lange et al., 2016). Other research supports that schadenfreude indeed regulates dominance hierarchies (Lange and Boecker, in press). More precisely, schadenfreude was more likely a response to a misfortune of a person who displayed dominance (e.g., hubristic pride) after success. Moreover, once schadenfreude was publicly expressed, the initially successful person’s perceived dominance decreased as compared to when others’ schadenfreude was expressed privately (e.g., laughing behind the back) or when there was only awkward silence. This provides at least indirect evidence that dispositional malicious envy contributes to the regulation of status hierarchies via aggressive strategies, such as the public expression of schadenfreude, to downregulate others’ status.

The current framework also suggests that dispositional benign and malicious envy carry important, but distinct, consequences for individuals’ well-being. Indeed, upon encountering a high-status comparison standard, dispositional benign and malicious envy are both related to painful feelings (Lange and Crusius, 2015a). This dovetails with theorizing that envy is a fundamentally painful emotion (Lange et al., in press; Tai et al., 2012). However, a prestige strategy should foster positive affect in the long-run because individuals can advance (Henrich and Gil-White, 2001), or they may form close relationships with others in environments fostering learning and individual growth, which could satisfy their need to belong (Baumeister and Leary, 1995). In contrast, a dominance strategy should sustain negative affect because the fixed hierarchies probably prevent advancement of individuals who are low in status (Henrich and Gil-White, 2001).

Furthermore, others’ dislike of dominant individuals (Cheng et al., 2013) may isolate them. Such isolation could worsen their mood (Baumeister and Leary, 1995). Initial evidence supports these predictions (Lange and Crusius, 2016). Dispositional benign envy was positively correlated with cognitive (Satisfaction with Life Scale; Diener et al., 1985) and positive-affective (Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; Thompson, 2007) components of well-being, whereas dispositional malicious envy revealed the opposite pattern. This provides evidence for potential long-term consequences of dispositional benign and malicious envy on individuals’ well-being in line with their desire for status.

Collectively, the evidence is consistent with the notion that dispositional benign envy leads to prestige attainment and consequently long-term positive affect. In contrast, dispositional malicious envy leads to strategies aimed at undermining the superior’s dominance and consequently long-term negative affect. Our status framework can therefore account for previous findings related to dispositional envy and extends these via its relation to the distinction between prestige and dominance. Furthermore, such a framework may illuminate the complex mutual relationship of envy and adverse clinical outcomes such as depression. The latter may be fostered by the sense of low control that characterizes dispositional malicious envy. In a similar vein, chronic inferiority and low self-efficacy in depression may make people vulnerable to status threats and veer them into malicious envy (Appel et al., 2015, 2016).

The present reasoning further implies that chronic reactions to threatened status are shaped by social environments and have wide-ranging effects on society itself. Status is an inherently social variable because it relies on consensus among peers (Anderson et al., 2015). Status is a social construct which suggests that dispositional forms of benign and malicious envy should be influenced by societal variables and, in turn, have consequences for societal outcomes.
SOCIETAL DETERMINANTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF ENVY

The strategy that people use to attain status may be a characteristic of the social environment (Leung and Bond, 2004). Although different strategies can be successful for attaining status in the same environment (Cheng et al., 2013), some strategies may be more prevalent in certain environments than others. The prevalent strategy that leads to status attainment in a specific society should both shape and be shaped by certain belief systems that people hold about how status is gained in their society (Kay et al., 2010; Leung and Bond, 2004; Ruiu, 2013). If this is the case, then socially shared beliefs could be potent predictors of envy and, consequently, societal outcomes. Which beliefs may be important in predicting dispositional benign and malicious envy?

Although the characteristics that allow societies to determine certain belief systems are not fully understood (Leung and Bond, 2004), people hold different beliefs about how they can attain status. One such belief is the Protestant Work Ethic (PWE; Weber, 1930). The concept of PWE is characterized by four core components: hard work, no leisure, asceticism, and independence/self-reliance (Modrack, 2008). Research suggests that people who strongly believe in PWE have a stronger internal locus of control (Furnham, 1987; Mirels and Garrett, 1971), greater internal responsibility (Christopher and Schlenker, 2005), and respond to the fairness of a game by allocating rewards according to equity norms (Greenberg, 1978). Thus, people endorsing PWE attribute status to internal, unstable, and controllable sources.

How exactly may this attribution pattern affect envy? Notably, research supports a relationship between dispositional envy and the appraisal of personal control (Lange et al., 2016). High perceptions of personal control are correlated with dispositional benign envy. As the belief in PWE stresses the role of hard work and effort in obtaining status, people who believe that they can control their status should therefore also be prone to dispositional benign envy. We collected preliminary support for these predictions. Correlational evidence suggests that a high belief in PWE predicts benign envy (Crusius et al., 2016).

Investigating the relationship between societal beliefs and envy may also help with understanding more distal effects of the emotional pathways from societal beliefs to societal outcomes. Specifically, the hard work and asceticism that characterizes PWE may lead to high societal status and also to the accumulation of capital and economic success (Mirels and Garrett, 1971; Modrack, 2008; Weber, 1930). Accordingly, in previous research PWE has been shown to correlate with job satisfaction, job involvement, organizational commitment, conscientiousness, and job performance (Miller et al., 2002). In light of the current framework, the relationship between PWE and economic outcomes may be mediated by benign envy. This is in line with the finding that PWE is linked to benign envy, which then motivates people to strive for a prestigious position when confronted with a high-status person. This hypothesis still needs to be tested.

Is there a complementary belief system that should foster the development of dispositional malicious envy? Our own data suggest that dispositional malicious envy is tied to an external locus of control (Crusius et al., 2016). Thus, it should be fostered by any societal belief system that stresses the importance of external forces. Such belief systems are, for instance, fatalism (Esparza et al., 2015; Paulhus and Carey, 2011; Ruiu, 2013), belief in genetic determinism (Keller, 2005), or the belief in a controlling God (Kay et al., 2008; Kay et al., 2010). Moreover, the link between variables such as fatalism and dispositional malicious envy could then also link the malicious envy to societal outcomes. This may be because fatalism correlates with hostility and aggression (Sadowski and
In light of the current framework, this could be an effect of dispositional malicious envy. Thus, we hypothesize that belief systems (e.g., fatalism) will correlate with dispositional malicious envy, mediating an effect on hostile societal outcomes.

In sum, the status framework of dispositional envy predicts that it is associated with variables at the societal level. This is in line with theoretical considerations by sociologists (Schoeck, 1969) and philosophers (D’Arms, 2013) who argue that envy plays an important role in the development of societal beliefs and political changes. However, these hypotheses require more empirical scrutiny. Our initial evidence links dispositional benign envy to PWE and our framework suggests a relation of dispositional malicious envy and beliefs in fatalism. These correlations could be starting points for investigating the role of envy in society.

CONCLUSION

The desire for social status and its beneficial outcomes should lead people to react immediately to status threats. We described how a dispositional tendency to react with envy may be one important emotional pathway to overcome this painful situation. Taken together, the evidence supports the notion that dispositional benign envy constitutes an inclination to react to threats to a person’s prestige. It motivates behavioral tendencies to re-gain status and leads to increased personal well-being and potentially societal flourishing. In contrast, dispositional malicious envy constitutes an inclination to react to dominant upward standards. It motivates behavioral tendencies to harm the other’s status and leads to decreased personal well-being and potentially societal disruptions. Thus, research on dispositional envy may contribute to our understanding of status regulation on individual, interpersonal, and societal levels of analysis.

REFERENCES


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